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Policy Brief | Cyprus’s Security Architecture in the Axis of British Sovereign Base Areas and Regional Conflicts

Policy Brief  ·  2026/1  ·  GPoT Center · 01 Aprıl 2026

Cyprus's Security Architecture in the Axis of British Sovereign Base Areas and Regional Conflicts

Author: Dr. Nur Çetiner

This text is the English translation of the GPoT Policy Brief originally published on March 12

Summary

This study argues that the incomplete decolonization process inherited from the 1960 treaties has turned Cyprus into a war zone against its will. Emphasizing that the current status quo is no longer a sustainable balance but constitutes a collective risk threatening the right to life of both communities, the study concludes that establishing a common security mechanism is an ontological necessity. It asserts that this must be achieved without becoming entangled in the inertia of traditional diplomatic negotiation processes.

Keywords: Cyprus Issue, US-Israel and Iran War, British Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs), Eastern Mediterranean Geopolitics

Introduction & Context

This article was originally intended to be about the changing political atmosphere in Cyprus following the recent Presidential elections and the relationship of this new political will with Türkiye. However, it could not keep pace with the rapidly shifting agenda both in our country and the Middle East. The attacks launched by the US and Israel against Iran on February 28 have directly affected both the political atmosphere and social life in Cyprus, because the resulting war in the region impacts not only the warring parties but also the other peoples of that region.

While the lack of a solution to the Cyprus issue leaves the island's status in a gray area in terms of international law, the sovereign status of British bases turns the communities on the island into parties to a war against their will. At this point, the Cyprus problem is no longer just a technical diplomatic dispute; it has become an existential issue threatening the physical presence of the island.

The Changing Paradigm and the 2025 Elections

The TRNC Presidential elections held on October 19, 2025, can be seen as a strong civil response to the two-state solution model that has dominated Turkish Cypriot politics in recent years. [1] Tufan Erhürman's election with a vision for a federal solution brings back to the agenda the fact that the status quo on the island is not just a diplomatic deadlock, but an obstacle to the existential will of the Turkish Cypriot people. These election results are an important indicator that, contrary to separatist models, the Turkish Cypriot people desire a federal future integrated with international law and based on the political equality of the two communities.

However, the desire for a federation does not mean Türkiye relinquishing its guarantor rights on the island. As stated by Sıla Usar İncirli, Deputy of the Republican Turkish Party (CTP), the federal will of Turkish Cypriots is unfortunately reflected in Türkiye by being stripped of its essence and distorted with different meanings. What is essentially desired in the north of the island is "bi-zonal, bi-communal political equality." [2] This new political climate emerging after the election shows that the Turkish Cypriot people no longer have the patience to be ignored. However, this internal declaration of will is simultaneously being tested by the massive security threat created by the regional war that broke out on February 28, 2026. The regional conflagration has pushed the demand for visibility and self-determination — pointed out by İncirli — beyond being a political right, turning it into a necessity to establish a common security shield for the island's survival as a whole.

1960 Legacy: Sovereign Bases and Legal Anomaly

The demand of Turkish Cypriots to have a say over their own future is not merely a contemporary polemic. Indeed, the treaties signed when the Republic of Cyprus gained independence in 1960 did not provide full decolonization; instead, they created a legal anomaly under the name of "Sovereign Base Areas" (SBAs) inherited from the colonial era. [3] The Akrotiri and Dhekelia regions were not considered territory of the newly established Republic but were left under the direct sovereignty of the United Kingdom. This status turned into a security disaster for the entire island with the regional war starting on February 28, 2026. These "sovereign" points — located in the heart of the island yet closed to the will of the islanders — demonstrated how fragmented and open to external intervention Cyprus's sovereignty is following the attack on March 2. [4] The British bases on the island have made Turkish and Greek Cypriots targets for missiles aimed at a region they do not control or own.

In the first week of operations, the logistical and intelligence support provided to Israel by the Akrotiri base, combined with Iran's declarations of "legitimate targets," moved the island directly into the line of fire. [5] This escalating asymmetric threat in the region shows that the Cyprus issue is not just a fight over status, but now a matter of survival and ontological security. [6] Although the attack on the British base on March 2 did not cause any casualties, it highlighted a common security problem for both the north and south of the island. [7] The British bases, a legacy of incomplete decolonization, are today making the island part of wars against its consent. While these bases function as active centers for offensive operations, the island's population is left completely devoid of civil defense and security mechanisms in the event of a counter-attack.

Uncontrolled Militarization

On the other hand, the accelerating military cooperation of the Republic of Cyprus (Greek Cypriot Administration) and its open declarations toward becoming a NATO member are removing security from the collective will of the islanders and appending it to the conflict zone of global blocs. [8] The decision by European countries to send warships and military ammunition to the island one after another after March 2 is transforming Cyprus into a heavily armed war zone in the Eastern Mediterranean. [9] French President Macron's stance that "an attack on Cyprus is an attack on Europe," followed by the deployment of French warships and air defense systems, elevates the militarization on the island to a global crisis. [10]

This uncontrolled militarization pushes Turkish Cypriots and proponents of a federal solution into a greater paradox. The Greek Cypriot Administration's desire to enter the NATO umbrella is a security construct that excludes the Turkish presence on the island and Türkiye's guarantor rights. For this reason, Türkiye strongly opposes Republic of Cyprus's NATO membership. However, the March 2 attack showed that existing military elements on the island serve no purpose other than expanding the target lists of Iran or similar regional actors. This situation makes the lack of a solution not only structural but also a military Gordian knot. Beyond negotiations, the need for an urgent common security mechanism becomes vital at this point; for the foreign weapons piled on the island, rather than ensuring the common security of the two peoples, reduce the island to the position of a disposable pawn in a global showdown.

Following the decision of European countries to send warships to Republic of Cyprus, Türkiye also deployed 6 F-16 fighter jets and defense systems to the island on March 9 to ensure the security of the TRNC. [11] This move can be read as a deterrent against asymmetric threats in the region. Faced with the role of British bases putting the island within Iran's missile range, Türkiye is faced with the necessity of bringing air defense capacity to the island to protect its own strategic depth and the right to life of the Turkish Cypriot people. However, this military reinforcement is a temporary security armor to prevent the island from being a hostage actor of regional wars, rather than a final solution. Türkiye's interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan) doctrine can only be secured in the long term through a federal security architecture that removes the island from being a conflict zone. Looking through the lens of the Iran war, a federal-based solution is the most rational path not only for the islanders but also for Türkiye's interests. Türkiye's presence and the Blue Homeland doctrine can be reinforced by making the island a haven of peace rather than a center of instability. A federal roof would combine Türkiye's guarantor rights with a regional defense vision.

The Security Cost of Division

The fact that the island has become a target for such attacks tragically demonstrates the security vulnerability created by the division in Cyprus. The reality that political borders between the north and south offer no protection against regional missile ranges shows that security can no longer be built unilaterally, but only on common ground. In this context, the status quo in the Cyprus issue is no longer a sustainable balance, but a collective risk threatening the right to life of both peoples. As long as the lack of a solution leaves the island as a gray area deprived of international legal protection, the operational appetite of extra-regional powers increases. The first and most urgent agenda of the negotiation table should be the limitation of the offensive use of these bases through international guarantees.

However, it is clear today that there is no time left to wait for the traditional slowness of diplomatic processes and negotiation rounds that last for years. The need for regional security must now be above all political agendas and status discussions. The answer to why the Cyprus issue has evolved into a structural deadlock lies in the fact that the security architecture on the island was designed not by the islanders, but according to the interests of external actors. For example, while both peoples of the island are under a vital threat stemming from British bases, the fact that some regional actors read this crisis as a strategic opportunity instead of a humanitarian tragedy reveals the malicious structural mindset behind the lack of a solution. Statements from the Greek side describing the war and increasing tension in the region as an opportunity to withdraw Turks from the island show that the issue is not about ensuring security, but about liquidating the political existence of Turkish Cypriots and Türkiye's guarantor rights. [12] Trying to use this situation as a military withdrawal move while the ontological security of Turkish Cypriots is at stake is the product of a calculative mindset that disregards the lives of both communities on the island.

The failure to complete decolonization can be seen as the fundamental element making the deadlock structural. However, Cypriots today do not have the time to wait for slow diplomatic processes. Beyond negotiations, it is of vital importance for both communities to establish an urgent common security mechanism and create a collective civil defense shield for the island against regional attack threats.

Conclusion

At this point, the search for a result-oriented and timetabled solution advocated by President Tufan Erhürman can be read as a way out to transform the island from a war base into a haven of peace, beyond being an ideological preference. [13] A Cyprus united under a federal roof would be able to put forth a common sovereign will against the use of the island as a military base by the British; thus, the ontological security of Turkish and Greek Cypriots would not be sacrificed to the strategic calculations of extra-regional powers.

On the other hand, the situation is even worse for Turkish Cypriots because as long as the deadlock continues, their say in such regional crises remains weak or non-existent. Furthermore, contrary to the claims of TRNC Prime Minister Ünal Üstel, not only the south but also the north faces this danger. [14] An attack from Iran or another country in the future will affect the entire island without making ethnic or religious distinctions. Bullets and missiles do not discriminate between communities. The ontological security of Turkish and Greek Cypriots is only possible through cooperation that will dissipate the shadow of sovereignty created by the British bases. The lack of a solution now carries not just a loss of status, but a direct risk of loss of life.

This fire in the Middle East reminds us that a solution based on the cooperation of the two peoples in Cyprus is not just a political necessity, but a survival strategy. However, today, no one has the time to wait for negotiation processes spread over years. In this new reality where regional threats know no borders, establishing a common security mechanism between the two communities is a vital necessity. The island's ability to remain the home of the communities living there, rather than a military base, depends on this collective security shield to be established on the ground, before diplomatic maneuvers at the table.

Furthermore, this crisis could provide a historic ground for cooperation for the three guarantors of Cyprus (Türkiye, Greece, and the UK). The risk of a regional war affecting the island opens a window of opportunity for guarantor countries to transform their military presence from an element of conflict into a collective defense shield that ensures the general security of the Eastern Mediterranean. European powers designing the island as a unilateral defense fortress brings the risk of an encirclement that directly targets Türkiye's guarantor rights and regional stability. Therefore, a dialogue to be established particularly between Türkiye and Republic of Cyprus is of great importance not only against today's attack threats but also for the management of future energy and geopolitical crises.

However, a scenario where the years-long and now normalized deadlock continues is highly probable. If the parties fail to reach a compromise at this critical threshold and continue to remain in the gray area of the status quo, the island will become a target where extra-regional powers uncontrollably pile weapons, international law is completely bypassed, and which is ready to explode at any moment. Insisting on disagreement means taking the fate of both communities out of their own hands and abandoning the island to the line of fire of regional actors.

References

  1. Deutsche Welle. "Kıbrıs 'Erhürman' dedi, Bahçeli seçimlerin iptalini istedi." October 20, 2025. Accessed March 6, 2026. https://www.dw.com/
  2. Özgür Gazete. "İncirli: İfadelerim Türkiye'deki bazı yayın organlarında özünden koparıldı, farklı anlamlara çekildi." January 21, 2026. Accessed March 7, 2026. https://ozgurgazetekibris.com/
  3. Stergiou, A. 2015. "The Exceptional Case of the British Military Bases on Cyprus." Middle Eastern Studies , 51(2): 285–300.
  4. Time. "British Base Hit in Cyprus, U.K. Terror Threat Under Review as Iran War Spreads." March 2, 2026. Accessed March 6, 2026. https://time.com/
  5. TRT Haber. "İran'dan Avrupa ülkelerine 'meşru hedef haline gelirsiniz' uyarısı." March 7, 2026. Accessed March 7, 2026. https://www.trthaber.com/
  6. Mitzen, J. 2006. "Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma." European Journal of International Relations , 12(3): 341–370.
  7. BBC News. "Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'nden İngiltere'ye tepki: 'Daha fazlasını bekliyoruz'." March 5, 2026. Accessed March 7, 2026. https://www.bbc.com/
  8. Deutsche Welle. "Güney Kıbrıs NATO üyeliği için yeniden bastırıyor." March 6, 2026. Accessed March 7, 2026. https://amp.dw.com/tr/
  9. Deutsche Welle. "Avrupa ülkeleri Kıbrıs'a savaş gemilerini gönderiyor." March 5, 2026. Accessed March 7, 2026. https://www.dw.com/tr/
  10. The New York Times. "France is Sending a Large Naval Force to the Middle East." March 9, 2026. Accessed March 10, 2026. https://www.nytimes.com/
  11. BBC NEWS. "Türkiye'nin Kıbrıs'ın kuzeyine savaş uçağı konuşlandırması ne anlama geliyor?" March 9, 2026. Accessed March 10, 2026. https://www.bbc.com/turkce/
  12. Kıbrıs Gazetesi. "Tufan Erhürman'dan Dendias'ın Açıklamalarına Tepki." March 5, 2026. Accessed March 8, 2026. https://kibrisgazetesi.com/
  13. Erhürman, T. 2025. İlk 100 gün . Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı. Accessed March 6, 2026. https://cb.gov.ct.tr/Portals/3/ILKYUZGUN.pdf
  14. Kıbrıs Postası. "Ünal Üstel: KKTC'de endişe yok çünkü Türkiye güvencemizdir." March 5, 2026. Accessed March 6, 2026. https://www.kibrispostasi.com/

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